Intelligence In The War With Germany 1939-45
Most recent studies have covered aspects of the military intelligence available to Britain and her allies during the second World War, but until now no succinct and authoritative survey of the whole field has existed. By the end of 1942 Ultra had become the richest and most reliable of the many different sources, but the relation between their individual contributions requires analysis. This magisterial book proves that service and offers a detailed study.
When war began, Britain was as ill-prepared in intelligence as in armaments. Civilian scientists had discovered the principle of radar in the mid-1930s, but everything else had to be learned from scratch in the heat of emergency. First signs of improvement came in mid-1941, when Ultra targeted navel vessels and bomber aircraft onto so many of Rommel's supply ships that the Afrika Korpa almost withered on the vine. From then on intelligence played an increasingly indispensable part in final victory. Ultra won the Battle of the Atlantic, driving the U-boats back to coastal waters by June 1943. Ultra confirmed the whereabouts of the German tanks as Montgomery planned the breakthrough at Alamein. Only 'Bomber' Harris refused to give intelligence the credit it deserved; on the basis of new evidence this fascinating book strongly reinforces criticism of his costly mistake.
