The Gallipoli campaign was launched in April 1915 in an effort to knock Turkey out of the war but the force that was deployed was too small to achieve its aim. Moreover, the commander, General Sir Ian Hamilton was at fault in the way he conducted his campaign. Never happier than when he was in the thick of action, Hamilton was an excellent tactician but, by 1915, and in a situation like Gallipoli, his style of leadership was outdated. This book examines why Hamilton failed at Gallipoli and shows how, in spite of that failure and it being his last command, he became a well respected military prophet who many several perceptive predictions about the future of warfare. AUTHOR: John Phillip Jones is an American professor emeritus who was born and educated in Britain and served in the Army as a National Serviceman. An applied economist, he has written fifteen books on the measurement of marketing effects, which have been translated into ten languages. With a lifelong interest in military history, he has visited most of the world's major battlefields and, in 2009, published The Successes and Sacrifices of the British Army in 1914.
