A detailed re-examination of Midway, the most famous battle in the Pacific Theater of World War II.
In June 1942, the United States Navy (USN) inflicted a decisive defeat on the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) off Midway Atoll. During the battle, four Japanese fleet carriers were lost, while the Americans suffered the loss of a single carrier. This dramatic result blunted the IJN’s offensive capabilities in the Pacific and passed the initiative to the USN.
The course of the battle has been outlined in many previous works. Since this was only the second carrier battle in history, doctrine for both sides was immature. This book will carefully examine the competing doctrines, as well as the tactics used by both sides. Much of this was driven by the ships and aircraft in service, while both sides had leaders who struggled under existing doctrine. Only after understanding existing doctrine, tactics, leaders, and the capabilities of the ships and aircraft involved can the results of the battle be fully explained and understood.
The American plan was driven by exquisite intelligence and Admiral Nimitz’s courage to use it to the extent he committed the USN’s remaining strength to the battle. The Japanese plan exhibited total arrogance and set their carrier force up for defeat in detail.
This is a book built around hard-core analysis of the battle. The reasons for the American victory and the Japanese disaster will be fully outlined. In the final analysis, as is true in many battles, the side making the fewest errors and with the most fortune prevailed. At Midway, American luck, magnified by bad Japanese doctrine and decisions, provided the margin of victory. As unsatisfying as this conclusion may be to many, the role of luck dominated in the outcome of the battle and needs to be a point of emphasis. No other book on Midway will provide such a thorough analysis of the battle. Other books have rigorously examined aspects o the battle, often from a single side, but none will present this level of insight into Midway.
